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Sunday, 23 August 2015 22:18

Troubles in China: Key current issues (Part 2)

Previous article discussed the structural problems in China, now we will cover the major current issues with Chinese economy.

  • Real Estate Bubble
  • Debt Spiral
  • Excess Capacity
  • Poor Reforms
  • Social Unrest
  • High Global Impact

REAL ESTATE BUBBLE:

China’s real estate share of GDP is about 23% of its GDP, this is three times that of the US at its peak. It clearly highlights an abnormally lopsided investment in real estate. Any dent in real estate will cause a significant damage to the GDP, and that may have already started happening. Some relevant observations are –

  1. Inventories in III and IV tier cities are holding equivalent of five years of demand – who is going to buy them?
  2. Vacancy rates near 25%
  3. Cities with declining new home prices now outnumber those with price increases by a historically wide margin 
  4. Measures of new floor space under construction and new floor space sold tipped into negative territory in 2014
  5. House prices to wages ratio is excessive in global terms
  6. Rental yields are very low at about 2.4%
  7. If house prices fall by more than 15%, a serious downturn may begin

Chinese ghost towns:

It is a shock to anyone who sees them for the first time. Just see yourself at the following links –

The Ghost Towns of China -

  • http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1339536/Ghost-towns-China
    • These amazing satellite images show sprawling cities built in remote parts of China that have been left completely abandoned, sometimes years after their construction. Elaborate public buildings and open spaces are completely unused, with the exception of a few government vehicles near communist authority offices. Some estimates put the number of empty homes at as many as 64 million, with up to 20 new cities being built every year in the country's vast swathes of free land. The photographs have emerged as a Chinese government think tank warns that the country's real estate bubble is getting worse, with property prices in major cities overvalued by as much as 70 per cent.
  • http://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-ideas/inside-china8217s-ghost-cities/story-e6frfqd9-1226716277487

Videos online -

DEBT SPIRAL:

To respond to the 2008 crisis, China injected massive credit to offset the collapse of external demand. That held up the growth rate but also led to a scary spike in debt levels, excess capacity, and surge in property markets. These are the similar policies that Japan had followed in 1980s and is still suffering from them. China will not be an exception and is expected to be on a similar trajectory. We discuss below, why this debt is a serious threat.

Excessive levels:

China’s debt is at high risk levels. It’s debt as a proportion of GDP climbed to 282% in 2014 from 158% in 2007 (Chart below).  That addition to debt is worth more than one entire Chinese economy’s GDP, added in just seven years. That’s huge and will put extreme pressure on its economy.

China’s total debt has risen to over $28 trillion by 2014, from $7 trillion in 2007, shooting four times in just seven years. Though, at 282 percent of GDP, China’s debt may be manageable, it is larger than that of the United States or Germany which have more balanced and stable economies.

Poor repayment possibilities:

A study by McKinsey shows three risks:

  1. Half of all loans are linked, directly or indirectly, to China’s overheated real-estate market. The households are deeply in debt.
  2. Unregulated shadow banking accounts for nearly half of new lending.
  3. Debt of many local governments is probably unsustainable.

Debt exposed to real estate:

China's household and private-sector debt has accelerated sharply even when compared to its fast growing economy. Outstanding loans for companies and households was at record 228% of GDP in 2014, more than double the 116% of 2007. A great portion of the household debt is exposed to real estate which is in high danger zone – with falling property prices, repayments would be difficult, defaults would be on rise.

Debt explosion in shadow banking:

The shadow banking in China has grown at 37 per cent annually since 2007. Though the precise size of shadow banking is difficult to be estimated, there have been some figures. The Fung Institute puts shadow banking assets a little over 50 per cent of GDP, or less than one-third the size of bank credit. McKinsey estimates that the sector is a bit larger. This is much smaller than the American shadow-banking sector, and the Chinese institutions are much less complex.

In China, like most countries, the expansion of shadow banking is the result of controls on the core-banking which prevent banks from meeting the needs of savers and borrowers. Depositors are unsatisfied from core banking because government controls made the interest return unattractive. Borrowers are unsatisfied because banks would not give them loans, or offered only unattractive short-term funding. Though shadow banking system is a common phase in development, there are benefits as well as dangers. There are various forms of shadow banking like - trusts, leasing companies, credit-guarantee outfits and money-market funds.

Although bank lending is far bigger than the shadow variety but its rate of growth has now stabilised. Whereas the growth of the riskier forms of shadow lending, is accelerating (see chart). Shadow banks accounted for almost a third of the rise in lending last year, ballooning by over 50% in the process. 

Trust loans are loans given by trusts. They are regulated by the same agency that supervises banks, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC). Regulators have recently strengthened oversight of trusts and money is now flowing to other forms of less regulated channels. One such fast growing option is entrusted loans involving cash-rich companies, well-connected state-owned enterprises (SOEs), lending to less well-connected firms.

The risk in these various forms of shadow banking arises because they want to get around regulations, exposing themselves to yet more risk. Since their clients are sub-prime, who could not get loans from core banking; they are exposed to significant high risk. Most of their lending is to real estate and steel, the probable bubbles. If there is a crisis in shadow banking, it could easily spillover to the core banking and the real economy. Or, a serious downturn in some sectors could cause problems for shadow banking.  Many shadow loans are against property, but with cooling property prices, especially in smaller cities, there is a fear of a downward spiral. A pricking of this property bubble may lead to a panic in shadow banks, reducing access to credit, plummeting property prices and resulting in a falling economic growth.

Local governments unable to repay debt:

It is difficult to find the actual amount of local government debt in China. According to a survey by Beijing’s Tsinghua University, local-government debt was the worst-performing indicator in terms of public transparency among 294 major Chinese cities. Only six cities – Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Ningbo and Xiamen – disclosed their debt levels, the report said. “Among many city governments, even the most basic financial information is not disclosed,” the report said. It’s hard to tell. Official data are supposed to be released by China’s National Audit Office but it does not release regular reports. Occasionally it may disclose some small figures. Its recent data showed that local governments owed 17.89 trillion yuan at the end of June 2013. Analysts estimate the current figure is around 23 trillion yuan.

The local debt started zooming when four trillion yuan ($586 billion) stimulus was given in 2008 to offset the effects of the global sub-prime crisis. Like most of local-government debt in China, this was largely funded by bank loans. China’s local governments can’t borrow money directly they have created local financing vehicles to circumvent the rules.

There are serious problems with local government debt - officials do not use it prudently. The debt has been used for funding projects that may be creating excessive capacity or are infrastructures that are not needed. There are allegations that much of the money goes to official pockets.

The risk is that now with a cooling economy, local governments would find it increasingly difficult to repay. There are already several defaults. Though Chinese government has deep pockets to manage defaults but it is not a short term phenomena. The economy is in for a prolonged slowdown. 

Rate cuts, deflation, devaluation

China has already gone for four rate cuts and three reserve-ratio requirement reductions and has implemented debt-swap facilities to reduce financing costs for local governments in the recent months. This stimulates more demand for debt, potentially increasing risks of instability in China's financial system. And risks have already started affecting results - nonperforming loans climbed by a record 140 billion yuan in the first quarter of 2015 as the GDP cooled down.

China’s inflation is at a five-year low and it makes the existing debt repayment costly for debtors.

Yuan devaluation is likely to hit local government financing vehicles and companies that have taken Dollar denominated loans. 

Debt is a long term drag

McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) estimates that China’s government can bailout any property crisis. MGI thinks the risk is of future debt increases which may be necessary for economic growth. This may be an optimistic view as the possibilities of recovery and regaining normal growth would be difficult even after bailouts considering deteriorating economic structures, few sources of investment led growth, poor reforms for boosting domestic consumption, and moderate to low external demand scenario in future.

McKinsey views that high debt levels don't raise the risk of a dramatic crash rather they "have historically placed a drag on growth." One can validate this by considering how Japan did over the past two decades and the recent situations in Europe. There is enough empirical evidence that highly-indebted nations require increasingly larger stimulus to boost GDP.

China may not crash due to its debt, but double digit growth is now history for it. It enters a phase of slower growth with rising hurdles and higher probabilities of negative shocks.

EXCESS CAPACITY

An IMF study published in 2012 puts China’s average capacity utilization about 60% at the end of 2011, from 80% at end-2007. Capacity utilization is a proxy for assessing economic health. Lower utilization (meaning excess capacity) reflects a cooling down in economy.

This chart from SocGen draws on the IMF report to show the decline in capacity utilization:

This excess capacity is also weighing on prices of goods that are in deflationary mode and China is exporting this deflation globally. Root of the problem is blind and redundant investments aiming to raise GDP regardless of whether the means make any economic sense or not.

POOR REFORMS:

China is expected to reform its economy and move it from one based on investment to one based on domestic consumption. The problem is that domestic demand and purchasing power are not yet strong enough to drive the economy. China may not opt to raise wages as that would increase the cost of production, making exports more expensive.

China is plagued with inefficient and corrupt state owned organizations that managed to do away with their excess capacities, poor investments in redundant projects, and corruption as long as the economy was growing in double digits. But now they face the heat when economy is slowing and they have huge debt burdens to manage. Government has plans for privatization but little or almost no progress has been made on moving towards a market driven economy, and fair allocation of resources and funds. Rather, business environment is now more nationalistic and less open.

SOCIAL UNREST:

If there is a sharp slowdown in Chinese economy leading to a rise in significant unemployment, it will have serious socio-political repercussions. Masses are getting burdened with debt and have risky exposure to real estate. Rate cuts and easy money will further stimulate people to go for debt and when the property prices starts climbing down its impact will be very widespread.

Chinese government is well aware that it has to keep generating employment sources for its gigantic population, and it did so till now by pumping investments in manufacturing and infrastructure with main focus on exports. Now the tide has turned. Chinese face decades of unfavorable demographic dividend, losing the low labor cost advantage, burden of excess capacity, loss of any more productive investible options, falling external demand, looming risk of property bubble, poor domestic demand, and inefficient and corrupt SOEs – where is the light at the end of the tunnel?

China has huge reserves to manage capital flight and bailouts but there is a limit to that. It also has ability to control masses, but will it be able to do it in long run?

Recently, state planner said that China needs to ensure that risks presented by a slowing economy do not morph into social risks, acknowledging the problems the country faces should unemployment rise.

HIGH GLOBAL IMPACT:

China’s share for world growth was 23% in 2010 and by end of 2014 it had shot up to 38%. This single figure is sufficient to elucidate the impact on global growth if China slows down. This is the key reason many economists have stated that next global recession may come from China.

 

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